I. Introduction
On January 11, 2007, the Chinese military launched a KT-1 rocket that successfu destroyed a redundant Chinese Feng Yun 1-C weather satellite, which it had launche 1999, in Low Earth Orbit approximately 800 kilometers above the earth. As details of t test emerged, governments from around the world, including the United States, Canad and its ramifications.1 The Chinese remained tight-lipped in the next few day the test. Finally, twelve days after the test and in the face of increasing anxi the international community, the Chinese Government acknowledged its seeking to allay concerns regarding the military nature of the test as a potent of a space arms race, as well as criticism that it was inconsistent with the "pe poses" spirit underpinning the space law regime, the Chinese Government reaf it was committed to the "peaceful development of outer space."2
In another development, just ten days after the Chinese satellite test, the ernment confirmed that it would be willing to host a large U.S. military site fo gon's missile shield system, involving the construction of a radar facility east
The implication and practical import of the Czech Government statement soon after the Chinese test, adds further to an increasingly troubling perspect larly when one considers that just five years earlier the United States had with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, a significant bilateral treaty.4 The expressly prohibits development, testing and deployment of sea-based space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems.5 It was meant as an effec to limit anti-ballistic missile systems and thus a substantial factor in curbing strategic offensive arms.6 The key reason given by the United States was that was outdated.7 However, it is clear that the withdrawal provides the United few legal obstacles in developing strategic weapon systems, in particular spa vices critical to its National Missile Defense program, and American space su With China ascendant in the twenty-first century, the space-technology rival larly its military utility, among the space powers appears to be intensifying. R 2000, China unveiled an ambitious ten-year space program.8 While one of th immediate motivations for this program appears to be political prestige, C efforts almost certainly will contribute to improved military space system 1. In voicing its dismay at the test, a spokesperson for the United Kingdom Government wa have said:
We don't believe that this does contravene international law. What we are concerned however, is lack of consultation and we believe that this development of this technology a manner in which this test was conducted is inconsistent with the spirit of China's stateme the UN and other bodies on the military use of space.
United States actively pursuing a National Missile Defense program, in 2003, military official commented that China's army had already introduced the c "space force strength,"10 in apparent reference to a similar U.S. military conc indication that Chinese space programs are at least partially driven by military ity considerations is the fact that the Chinese space program has always been command of senior officers of the People's Liberation Army.12
These stark reminders of the military aspects of space technology raise que international law and the current legal regime regulating the military uses of o Moreover, as well as highlighting issues arising from the specific United Nation tional treaties and resolutions that form an integral part of the international law space, the utilization of space technology, in this respect, raises broader concern ing the "weaponization" of outer space and the use of such weapons in the con armed attack or as an act of self-defense, as recognized within the framewo United Nations Charter and the international legal regime that regulates of force.
The increasing weaponization of outer space poses not only difficult legal questions but also represents a clear and present danger to international peace and security. There is already a great fear of an arms race being undertaken in space, with the latest developments in both Beijing and Washington adding further fuel to that fire. In this context, one can certainly envisage that the deliberate destruction of, say, a communications or weather satellite by a missile such as was launched by China or like those that could be launched as part of the U.S. missile shield system, even if not resulting in any immediate civilian casualties, could have a devastating impact on a community, country, or even region of the world. Millions of lives and livelihoods could potentially be affected, economies destroyed, and essential services incapacitated.
Yet, although the position might not be as categorical as the United Kingdom spokesperson suggested in the quote referred to above, the legal regime that governs the possible weaponization of outer space is, as this article will discuss, unsatisfactory, capable of differing interpretations and largely protective of a State's sovereign right to utilize force in self-defense -even if that may involve the use of space technology -if it is deemed appro-10. Id. 11. In 1998, the United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) issued its Long Range Plan outlining the U.S. military vision for control of space and developing a capacity to project force from space. The first two mission statements of USSPACECOM's Long Range Plan are identified as "space support" and "force enhancement," meaning the use of space assets to facilitate military operations of combat forces on land, sea, and air. The next two mission statements of "space control" and "force application" are more controversial, as they suggest the weaponization of space, and are most closely related to combat in a future theatre of military space operations. Overall, these four mission areas encapsulate "space control." U.S. Space Command, Long Range Plan: Implementing USSPACECOM Vision for 2020 (1998), http://www.fas.org/spp/ military/docops/usspac/lrp.toc.htm. More significant was its sister document issued in 1999 by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), which expanded upon and reinforced themes raised by USSPACECOM's Long Range Plan. Among addressing other space issues, the DoD policy states: "Purposeful interference with U.S. space systems will be viewed as an infringement on our sovereign rights. The US may take all appropriate self-defense measures, including, if directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA), the use of force, to respond to such an infringement on US rights." Defi' of Defense, Directive 3100.10: Space Policy (1999).
piiate.13 In the end, although there are some fundamental underlying princip national law that are relevant to the issue of space weaponization, it is by no m that the deployment of such weapons, or their use as an act of force, are p certain circumstances.
This article seeks to discuss some of the broad questions, particularly in the light of ever-expanding military uses of outer space and the significance, particularly to the major powers, of the military and strategic value associated with space technology superiority.
This article first looks at the historical efforts of the two main protagonists, the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia, to develop space military technology, recognizing the unique strategic values this offered. It then highlights the relevant provisions of both international space law and the regime prohibiting the use of force under the United Nations Charter that may apply to the weaponization of outer space and proceeds to discuss the interaction of these legal principles to gauge whether and how they might, if at all, have a practical effect in curbing the growing threat posed by space weaponization, including in circumstances of a cyber-attack.
The authors conclude that, in light of the unique features of outer space and the very significant consequences that could emerge from a space arms race or, even worse, a "space war," the principles that do exist may not be specific enough to provide appropriate regulation for the increasingly diverse ways that outer space could be used during the course of armed conflict. It follows that there is a growing need to reach a consensus on additional space law regulation directly applicable to the increasing threat represented by the weaponization of outer space and its potential for use as a direct theatre of war.
II. The Historical Quest for Strategic Military Advantage in Outer Space
In order to evaluate the practical relevance of current international (space) law principles to the issue of space weaponization, it is necessary to first examine the historical development of space as a military area and the reasons behind this. The United States and the Soviet Union led the way in conquering outer space in the 1950s through a series of initiatives that included satellites, spacecraft launches, and nuclear detonations. In October 1957, humankind finally could regard space as a reachable frontier with the launch by the Soviet Union of Sputnik I, which proceeded to orbit the Earth. Almost immediately, important principles of space law were born. As Judge Lachs in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases observed:
[T]he first instruments that men sent into outer space traversed the air space of States and circled above them in outer space, yet the launching States sought no permission, nor did the other States protest. This is how the freedom of movement into outer space, and in it, came to be established and recognised as law within a remarkably short period of time.14 13. In this regard, one only need to recall Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 245 (July 8, 1996) where by a majority with the President's casting vote, the International Court of Justice, while noting that the threat or use of a nuclear weapon should comply with the requirements of international law relating to armed conflict, particularly the principles of international humanitarian law, was unable to categorically state that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would in every 
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In the same year as Sputnik 1, the United States successfully undertook nuc tions in space.15 It was already apparent that there were an increasing rang uses of outer space, with the only limitation being one's imagination and the of appropriate technology. Almost as soon as Sputnik I was launched, the i community became concerned about the possibility for use of outer space purposes as well as the fear that it could perhaps ultimately be used as a thea particularly in the context of the prevailing Cold War. In December 1958
Nations emphasized the need "to avoid the extension of present national rival new field."16 By 1961, the General Assembly had recommended that international United Nations Charter17 apply to "outer space and celestial bodies."18 peated in General Assembly Resolution 1962,19 which set forth a number o principles ultimately embodied in the Treaty on Principles Governing the States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and oth Bodies (the "Outer Space Treaty").20 Specific reference in the Outer Space T United Nations Charter, such as Article Ill's provision that activities in the and use of outer space shall be carried out "in accordance with international l the Charter of the United Nations," was important given that the maintenanc tional peace and security is the underlying principle of the system establishe Charter.21 It was assumed that, through the application of Article III of the Treaty, the prohibition on the use of force contained in Article 2, Section 4 of which represents a crucial element in the regulation of international relation equally applicable to the use of outer space.22
In 1961, the Soviet Union launched the first manned spaceflight when it Gagarin into orbit. The United States followed suit in 1962. This further the scale of the technological race between the United States and the Sovie marked the genesis of a technological race that would soon metamorphose int terrestrial arms race, with each seeking to assert dominance in space explorat age. As the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the intensified, the military utility outer space offered was not lost on those nati 15 21. Id. The first "Purpose" of the United Nations specified in U.N. Charter Article 1 , parag with the words: "To maintain international peace and security." Given the increasing global reliance on space systems and increasing militari weaponization of outer space, its evolution into a distinct theatre of militar appears increasingly imminent. The idea of space warfare has given rise to some disturbing rhetoric. In 200 mission headed by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggest "attack on elements of U.S. space systems during a crisis or conflict should not ered an improbable act."37 The report went on to (in)famously warn of the possib "Space Pearl Harbor" -a surprise attack on the space assets of the United Stat worryingly, space warfare has developed beyond mere talk and is now brew potent reality. Despite its positive aspects, the existing space law regime is ina deal with the specific challenges posed by these developments, and it is with thi that the following sections of this article juxtapose the weaponization of outer s the United Nations Charter regime on the use of force. Despite the feet that law regime is premised on the basic principle of peaceful purposes, outer spac dubious distinction of already being a highly militarized environment. purposes. Both of these space-faring powers, however, have steadfastly described all of their space missions as "peaceful."54 The new space power, China, also adheres to this description. In the past, it has been relatively easy to take issue with these assertions in circumstances where a space object is launched with the single purpose of conducting military activities. The crux of the present-day problem, however, is that the majority of those devices involved in military uses of outer space have a dual purpose not only in the sense that they are both offensive and defensive, but also because they carry out both civilian/commercial activities as well as military ones. This concept of a dual use satellite is by now well-known in space parlance, giving rise to further difficult legal issues.
In addition, there has traditionally been a great semantic and interpretational battleground regarding the meaning of the "peaceful purposes" principle that underpins the international space law regime. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, which states " However, almost as soon as this fundamental principle was enunciated, disagreement and confusion arose as to exactly what was meant by it. The United States, from the very beginning of the Space Age up to the present, has maintained the official position that "peaceful" means "non-aggressive" and not "non-military,"57 except for some of its earliest statements on the international control of space activities, which appeared to support the proposition that outer space should be used exclusively for non-military purposes.58
Apart from those early suggestions, the overriding goal of U.S. space policy during the pre-Outer Space Treaty era was to gain international recognition of the legality of reconnaissance satellites while simultaneously discouraging military space activities that threatened those assets.59 It is therefore not surprising that the traditional, almost dog- In contrast, as part of a diplomatic offensive to ban U.S. reconnaissance satelli Soviet Union initially took the view, at least publicly, that peaceful purpose non-military and that all military activities in space were thus prohibited, despite that it was undoubtedly already engaged in and contemplating the potential for m uses of outer space. Although the Soviet government consistently maintained th its activities in space were peaceful and scientific, its official line eventually soften military satellite programs came into their own. By the spring of 1958, less tha after the launch of Sputnik I, the anticipation of the availability of reconnaissance triggered a decisive shift in Soviet policy towards the view that space could and sh used for peaceful rather than non-military purposes, leading to the plausible co that the Soviet Union "acquiesced to the United States interpretation," at least
The U.S. position on Article III of the Moon Agreement is that it permits military activities that are not aggressive, that is, those undertaken for peaceful purposes. However, The argument for "non-aggressive" purposes is that since defensive systems create a deterrent that ultimately promotes peace, only the aggressive use of such systems will threaten their peaceful status. Given that all weapons systems are potential deterrents, this view allows states to assert that deploying arms (nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction excluded) on the moon and in its orbit and trajectory constitutes a "peaceful purpose" use of the moon.64
The reference in Article 111(2) to "any other hostile act or threat of hostile act" suggests that under the Moon Agreement a peaceful use will be a non-hostile use.65 Perhaps the most significant feature of that treaty is its articulation of the "common heritage of man- Yet, at the same time it was agreed that, as previously mentioned, Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty would provide that outer space shall be "used exclusively for peaceful purposes." However, this provision, while on first reading may appear relatively clear, is also a semantic and interpretational battleground. The impact of its ambiguity becomes clear when one considers the Reagan "Star Wars" program. It was premised on non-peaceful or aggressive uses but geared towards the purpose of defending the United States, a peaceful purpose of self-defense. It follows that "use" and "purpose" acquire a strong legal connotation. Thus, it has been argued the practical effect of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty is that both military and non-military applications may be deployed for peaceful purposes anywhere in space.72
Whether a particular technology is permitted in space also depends both upon the intended use of the technology and whether it is to be used in the vacuum of outer space or 66. Id. art. XI(1). In sum, the peaceful purposes provision set out in Article IV of the Outer Spa has been the subject of much analytical discussion as to its scope and meani there is general agreement, but not complete unanimity, among space law comm that this is directed against non-military rather than merely non-aggressive act reality has been different. It is undeniable that, in addition to the many comm scientific uses, outer space has and continues to be used for an expanding array o activities. Unless concrete steps are taken to arrest this trend -which will requir icant shift in political will, particularly among the major powers of the world - [R]egardless of their putative "destabilizing" character for international peace and security, the Outer Space Treaty does not prohibit the transiting, or even the orbiting, of conventional weaponry in space, including ASATs. The prohibition on orbiting of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, strongly suggests the distinction between those weapons, and conventional weapons of lesser destructive power, including those directed at satellites. Though Article IV(1) could easily be modified to affect the de-weaponization of space, conventional weapons are not proscribed.99
From the foregoing, it can be deduced that Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty contemplates the military use of space for scientific research and grants a carte blanche to 94 . Anderson, supra note 91, at 24 (a[t]he SDI provided a measure of legitimacy to many ideas that were formerly seen as impossible"). It was during the Gulf War in 1990 that the value of space assets to the condu was first utilized to a significant degree. Indeed, Operation Desert Storm was re the first space war. It was recognized that the use of space technology would integrated battle platform to aid in the implementation of military strategies. Assuming ASATs will be used for ASAT purposes (i.e. destroying targeted sat and not for later conversion into ABMs, the ABM Treaty does not limit ASA However, an ASAT that could be converted into an ABM might be considered system component for Article V purposes and, as a result, may violate the terms ABM Treaty.121 From a practical point of view, an aggressive ASAT deployment p could be viewed by an adversary as a mechanism to boost ABMs.122 As a result could therefore trigger enormous buildups of offensive missiles, which are preci the ABM Treaty was designed to prevent. "123 In this regard, ASATs and other S the capability to deploy ordinances from space deviate from the non-aggressive c of satellites and, in so doing, may appear to violate the non-aggressive mandate r of all space activities under the peaceful purposes restriction.
The crux of the matter is that the "Outer Space Treaty does not [explicitly] proh transiting, or even the orbiting, of conventional weaponry in space."124 This seized upon by those who assert the existence of a legal right to deploy certain weapons systems in outer space. As Major Ramey argues:
The prohibition on orbiting of WMDs, including nuclear weapons, strongly sugg the distinction between those weapons, and conventional weapons of lesser de tive power, including those directed at satellites. Though Article IV (1) could be modified to affect the de-weaponization of space, conventional weapons ar What's more, regardless of whether a satellite is struck by an ASAT weapon (be it a nuclear burst, kinetic weapon or high-energy particle beam) or a computer virus, the effect is the same -crippling of the satellite and/or its function. Under Brownlie's formulation then, cyber -attack on a satellite does indeed equate to the use of armed force . . . Thus, though space weapons were not actively envisaged during the drafting of the United Nations Charter, whether a satellite is struck by an ASAT weapon or ordnances are deployed by an SOV, under Brownlie's formulation this cyber-attack would equate to the use of armed force.127 A key issue is the matter of the use or threat of force. It is inconceivable that deployment of ASATs or SOVs would be seen as a benign activity given that they are offensive in 120. Halpern, supra note 65, at 191. Could a country consider the deliberate blanking out of its communication system military strategy of an opponent seeking to test its command systems and thus as a of use of force that could justify retaliatory actions such as the deployment of an A laser, or other electromagnetic weaponry? These are crucial questions, all the mo because they are of practical relevance rather than remaining in the realm of mer demic curiosity considering, for example, that USSPACECOM's long-range plan en passes space control articulated as "the ability to ensure un-interrupted access to spa U.S. forces and our allies, freedom of operations within the space medium and an ab to deny others the use of space, if required."135 Translated into legal terms, attemp "ensure un-interrupted access to space" and to maintain "an ability to deny others th of space"136 are expressions encompassing military force or at least the threat th Naturally this strategy has a number of worrying consequences, not the least of whic encourage other major space-faring powers to focus on their own military technolog order to (attempt to) keep on par with the United States. This has a snow-ball effect, the tendency of the United States and other major militarized powers to ever increa rely on space technology, potentially spiraling into a space weapons race despite the diplomatic efforts of the international community to prevent this. Even though United States may currently be in a position to claim space superiority, it can onl matter of time before other space-faring countries, perhaps China and India, will de equally sophisticated and potentially devastating space weapons technology. Indeed recent Chinese test seems to indicate that we are already approaching that point. A careful reading of the Liability Convention discloses that the corpus juris spatialis implicitly recognizes that under certain circumstances the intentional destruction of space objects might occur.149 The Liability Convention subjects states' parties to absolute liability for damage caused by its space objects on the earth's surface or to an aircraft in 145. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. IX. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a It is contended by some commentators that the right to respond with f self-defense, even to a triggering act that has already occurred, is temporally lim the Caroline incident indicated, the emergence of the customary right of self apparently involved a requirement of immediate action. Were the position ot there would be a strong argument the use of force is nothing more than a reprisa Looked at from another viewpoint, it could be asserted that this previously n technical interpretation ignores the fact that international law cannot compel any wait until it absorbs a devastating or lethal first strike before acting to protect its tegic circumstances and the consequences of surprise attacks have changed a g since the Caroline incident. Today, in an age of chemical/biological/nuclear we the time and capability available to a vulnerable state could be very limited ind
How long can a country afford to wait when innovations in technology now po situation where a surprise attack may be preceded by an elaborate tactical sche jams military communications and blinds satellites, thus crippling the state's inte gathering, early yarning and battlefield capabilities? Some scholars believe that a truly anticipator^ self-defense has emerged outside of Article 51 in light of the av of WMDs.157 Professor Thomas Franck, in discussing WMDs in the context of ism, presents a position that is equally applicable to the emergence of a viable doc anticipatory self-defense and, in the authors' views, also to space weaponizati transformation of weaponry to instruments of overwhelming and instant destru [brings] into question the conditionality of art 51, which limits states' exercise of of self-defense to the aftermath of an armed attack. Inevitably, first-strike capa begat a doctrine of 'anticipatory self-defence."1158 Professor Christopher Gr weighs in -also along the terrorism continuum but once again with resonanc weaponization of outer space -with the observation that in a nuclear age, it is th tially devastating consequences of prohibiting self-defense unless an armed attack ready occurred that leads one to prefer the interpretation permitting anti self-defense. He argues that this On the other hand, in the face of the significant advances in space technolo ing the development of space weaponization systems -that have left: the lega lagging behind, we should strongly champion the position that international s not a legal system independent from the law that governs on earth and tha terrestrial legal principles intended to promote peace and security should also Indeed, the terms of the Outer Space Treaty, reflecting three significant sembly resolutions from the 1960s, support the position that ground rules served in the exploration and the use of outer space, particularly in the absenc space law rules.168 These rules include the jus ad bellum principles regulatin force as well as the jus in bello principles that reflect the laws and customs of for both of these sets of principles is absolutely vital to the safety and securit kind as well as the interests of future generations.
Yet the combination (and culmination) of these two approaches to the lega of outer space -specific rules as and when agreed by the international commun translation of principles developed for terrestrial regulation to outer space much room for uncertainty and exploitation for military and strategic purpo sult, if we are to avoid grey areas in the law, it is necessary to develop specif rules and standards that categorically sanction the weaponization of all of o well as the engagement in any form of conflict in the region of space and a assets.
This may require additional space law regulation directly applicable to armed con and the use of force involving space technology. As part of these new rules, clear de tions need to be developed for concepts such as "space weapons," "peaceful purposes," "military uses." Moreover, the fundamental issue of where space begins should be de 165 . United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space at v., U.N
